In this paper, I shall prove, why the old fashion Artificial Intelligence cannot be the right answer.
Motivation
The criticism of the old fashion Artificial Intelligence, or as John Haugeland has called it GOFAI 1 , has almost begun with the birth of this area of research. The very bold theories of people like Newell, Simon, Fodor, Pylyshyn, Winograd, Minsky, Schank, et. al. about Human understanding and cognition in writings like [11, Newell (1958) ], [12, Newell (1980) ], [13, Newell & Simon (1981) ], [21, Simon (1979) ], [22, Simon (1981) ], [1, Fodor et al. (1974) ], [2, Fodor (1975) ], [3, Fodor (1980) ], [4, Fodor (1981) ], [5, Fodor (1983) ], [6, Fodor (1987) ], [7, Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) ], [14, Pylyshyn (1979) ], [15, Pylyshyn (1989) ], [16, Pylyshyn et al. (1989) ], [17, Pylyshyn (1984) ], [8, Minsky (1966) ], [9, Minsky (1967) ], [10, Minsky (1968) ], [23, Winograd (1972) ], [24, Winograd (1973) ], [25, Winograd (1979) ], [18, Schank & Childers (1984) ], [19, Schank (1986) ], [20, Schank (1990) ] and so on, have awoken a lot of attention towards GOFAI. There has been a lot of discussions between researchers pro and against GOFAI, each party trying to prove that the other party is wrong. These discussions have been going on for years now, and it does not seem, that they are going to end in any near future. In the beginning of 80's something very interesting happened. Connectionism began to come to the surface of the Earth again, and its development accelerated in a manner never seen before, and with it researchers in GO-FAI started attacking Connectionism, as if it was their biggest opponent. Yes, the old arch-rival of GOFAI was reincarnated. They tried right from the start of rising period for Connectionism to show, that Connectionism does not have a complete account for Human cognition, and Cognitive Science should almost turn the face from Connectionism, for that road is doomed to fail. I wonder, whether there is any substance in these kind of ideas. As a matter of fact, I shall suppose, that GOFAI has spoken the truth, and I shall follow my way from that point towards the unknown future.
Results
Let's now assume, that it is in fact true, that Human beings are Turing machines. What evil thing could happen as a consequence of this?! Well, let's find out.
Assumption 1 (GOFAI's Fundamental Assumption (GFA)) Human beings are Turing machines.
There are actually very interesting question about Turing machines, which we will now look at
Lemma 1 ((A 1)) The question, "Given a Turing machine M and a fixed input string w 0 , does M halt on w 0 ?" is Turing-undecidable.
Lemma 2 ((A 2)) The question, "Given a Turing machine M, is its output language Turing-decidable?", is Turing undecidable.
Lemma 3 ((A 3)) The question, "Given a Turing machine M, is its output language Context-free?", is Turing-undecidable.
Lemma 4 ((A 4))
The question, "Given a Turing machine M and a string w ∈ OUT (M), is it correct for u ∈ Σ * , that
Lemma 6 ((A 6)) The question, "Given a Turing machine M, does M decide OUT (M)?" is Turing-undecidable.
Lemma 7 ((A 7)) The question, "Given a Turing machine M and a fixed string w 0 ∈ Σ * , is w 0 in the OUT (M)?" is Turing-undecidable.
Lemma 8 ((A 8))
The question, "Given a Turing machine M, is it an Universal Turing machine?" is Turing-undecidable.
But we have also, Remark 1 (Abolfazlian (R 1)) (GFA) implies, that if a question about Turing machines is Turing-undecidable, then it cannot be answered by Human beings either.
Remark 2 (Abolfazlian (R 2)) If a question about Turing machines is
Turing-undecidable, then it will still be Turing-undecidable, if we substitute, in the question, the Turing machine by Universal Turing machine (UTM).
Remark 3 (Abolfazlian (R 3)) We Human beings can simulate any Turing machine on any input string, given an encoded version of the Turing machine and the input string. Thus we must be UTMs.
Now we have, that:
Theorem 1 (Abolfazlian (K 1)) Human beings cannot answer the question, "Given a Human being, is his/hers behaviour human?". Theorem 4 (Abolfazlian (K 4)) Human beings cannot answer the question, "Given a Human being and an arbitrary pattern of Human behaviour, can he/she decide (answer), whether he/she can produce that particular behaviour?". Theorem 5 (Abolfazlian (K 5)) Human beings cannot answer the question, "Given a Human being and a fixed pattern of Human behaviour, does he/she produce that particular behaviour?".
3 I have not explained the proofs for this and following Theorems in so many details as for Theorem (K 1), because the proofs go in very similar manner.
Proof: Lemma (A 7) & Remarks (R 1&2&3).
Theorem 6 (Abolfazlian (K 6)) Human beings cannot answer the question, "Given a Human being, is he/she really a Human being?!!".
Proof: Lemma (A 8) & Remarks (R 1&2&3
).
Conclusion
Now I wonder, if it would still be a "very" good idea to follow up the research program of GOFAI. May be people like Fodor and Pylyshyn should be more worried about consistency of their own ideas, instead of trying to show, that Connectionism has problems! Maybe after all Connectionism hasn't got anything to do with GOFAI's troubles, and GOFAI was unfortunately dead before it was ever born. But then again, it is a free World!!! or 3. b = R, w 2 = w 1 a 1 , and either
• u 1 = u 2 = e and a 2 = #.
Note that if b = L and w 1 = e, then (q 1 , w 1 , a 1 , u 1 ) yields no configuration, since there is no w 2 ∈ Σ * and a 2 ∈ Σ such that w 1 = w 2 a 2 . Such a configuration will be called a hanging configuration. On the other hand, every configuration, that is not a halted or a hanging configuration yields exactly one configuration in one step.
Definition 4 For any Turing machine M, ⊢ *
M is the reflexive, transitive closure of ⊢ M ; we say that configuration C 1 yields configuration
We say that the computation is of length n or has n steps. If χ L is computed by a Turing machine M, then M is said to decide L, or to be a decision procedure for L.
Definition 7 If M = (K,Σ,δ,s) is a Turing machine and w ∈ Σ * 0 , then M is said to halt on input w if and only if (s,#w#) yields some halted configuration. Similarly, M is said to hang on input w if (s,#w#) yields some hanging configuration.
Definition 8 (Turing acceptable languages)
We say that a Turing machine M accepts a string w ∈ Σ * 0 , if M halts on input w. Thus M accepts a language L ⊆ Σ * 0 if and only if L = {w ∈ Σ * 0 : M accepts w} and a language is said to be Turing-acceptable if there is some Turing machine that accepts it.
